This article analyses India’s Ministry of Defence plus its influence on civil-military relations. It argues that, until very recently, the strategic intent of the defence ministry has primarily focused on civilian control over the military. The resultant institutional structure of civilian control compromised the effectiveness of the Indian military. This was due to several features of the country’s tipe of civilian control, including a lack of civilian expertise, bureaucratic procedures underlying civil-military interactions as well as military autonomy. Acknowledging these problems, the government has currently embarked on reforms to maximize military power. It is doing so mainly by infusing military expertise at the ministerial level. However, this may upend the civil-military dynamic in India plus the success of this initiative remains to be seen. Conceptually, this article examines a possibly pernicious effect of a civilian dominated ministry plus highlights the importance of expertise in enhancing both control plus military effectiveness.
Civilian control over the military is among the bigger successes of India’s democracy. At the time of independence, this was not a certainty plus India is rare among post-colonial states to successfully maintain democratic control. The Ministry of Defence was central to this effort. The institution inherited sub-organisations from colonial times but the Ministry of Defence, in its current form under a civilian political leader, was formally established at the time of independence in August 1947. Over time, the ministry obtained prominence by bridging political plus military leaders. However, India’s tipe of civilian control compromised the effectiveness of the Indian military – as repeatedly pointed out by its strategic community. Responding to these sentiments, in December 2019, the Indian government unveiled plans to create a Department of Military Affairs (DMA) within the Ministry. This, in turn, is to be headed by the newly created Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). In addition, the CDS has been given an ambitious mandate to usher in military reforms. India is therefore attempting a simultaneous ‘twin transformation’—of the Ministry of Defence plus its armed forces. What is driving these changes in the ministry plus why is it necessary? What does India’s experience with its Ministry of Defence inform us about the practice of civil-military relations?
While examining these questions, this article makes the following points. First, India’s Ministry of Defence has primarily focused on attaining civilian control over the military. It has done this by gradually imbibing a set of rules, norms, plus procedures in its interaction with the military. Second, the institutional structure of civilian control compromised the effectiveness of the Indian military. This was due to several features of this form of civilian control, including a lack of civilian expertise, bureaucratic procedures underlying civil-military interactions as well as military autonomy. Finally, acknowledging these problems, the government has currently embarked on reforms to maximise military power. The primary purpose seems to be to infuse military expertise at the ministerial level. The success of this initiative is however far from assured plus would require systemic reforms in both civil plus military organisations.