India is focusing on maritime-security cooperation with ASEAN and Southeast Asian states – and more vocally supporting their territorial claims in the South China Sea – because it seeks to counter China’s regional influence and its activities that might threaten India’s freedom of navigation, given that over 55% of the latter’s trade passes through the South China Sea and Malacca Strait. New Delhi also wants to prevent the establishment of precedents that China could then apply to the Indian Ocean, where Beijing could become more assertive in its engagement with India and its neighbours.
As such, during a March 2024 visit to Manila, the Indian foreign minister stated publicly ‘India’s support to the Philippines for upholding its national sovereignty’. In 2023, for the first time, India called for ‘adherence’ to the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea.
Since 2020, the Indian Navy has held bilateral naval exercises with the Thai and Philippine navies and participated in recurring exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, with a view to enhancing India’s presence in the region. It also reportedly held a bilateral exercise with the Myanmar Navy – its first since 2019 – on the sidelines of an Indian Navy-led multilateral exercise. However, this exercise was not announced by the Indian government, likely due to the sensitivities involved given Myanmar’s ongoing conflict.
New Delhi has also stepped up what used to be seen by India as ‘sensitive’ defence engagements, such as submarine visits. February 2023 saw the first visit of an Indian submarine to Indonesia, followed by a visit to Singapore that September. In the same year, the Indian Navy established a trilateral exercise with Australia and Indonesia. India’s only other regional trilateral exercise is held with Singapore and Thailand.
India’s army and air force have participated in few bilateral exercises since 2020 compared to the navy – both held exercises with Singapore and Malaysia, while the army has also conducted exercises with Indonesia and Vietnam. There is therefore much scope to increase army and air force engagement between India and Southeast Asian states.
Beyond participation in naval exercises, however, India’s capacity to counter China’s regional presence is limited. India’s priority is the Indian Ocean: countering China’s influence there is where New Delhi’s resources will be focused for the foreseeable future. Therefore, to make its presence known in Southeast Asia, India will likely seek to hold regular defence ministerial meetings with ASEAN as well as India–ASEAN naval exercises, and increase the number of bilateral navy, army and air force exercises it holds with regional countries.
Working more closely with regional states in this way could serve India’s plans to make Southeast Asia a key market for exports of its defence equipment – potentially enhancing trust, increasing India’s regional influence and enabling more ambitious cooperation on defence and security issues.